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Abstract This study proposes and tests an alternative to the extant earnings man-
agement explanation for zero and small positive earnings surprises (i.e., analyst
forecast errors). We argue that analysts’ ability to strategically induce slight pes-
simism in earnings forecasts varies with the precision of their information.
Accordingly, we predict that the probability that a firm reports a small positive
instead of a small negative earnings surprise is negatively related to earnings
forecast uncertainty, and we present evidence consistent with this prediction. Our
findings have important implications for the earnings management interpretation of
the asymmetry around zero in the frequency distribution of earnings surprises. We
demonstrate how empirically controlling for earnings forecast uncertainty can
materially change inferences in studies that employ the incidence of zero and small
positive earnings surprises to categorize firms as suspected of managing earnings.
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1 Introduction
The literature provides robust evidence of an asymmetry around zero in the
frequency distribution of U.S. firms’ earnings surprises (i.e., analyst forecast errors),
suggesting a systematic tendency of firms to meet or just beat rather than just miss
analyst expectations (Degeorge et al. 1999; Brown 2001; Abarbanell and Lehavy
2003; Dechow et al. 2003). The common explanation for this is that firms
systematically manage earnings to meet expectations (e.g., Degeorge et al. 1999),
and subsequent research frequently categorizes firms as suspected of managing
earnings when their earnings meet or just beat analyst expectations (e.g., Cheng and
Warfield 2005; Lim and Tan 2008; Fang et al. 2015).
However, empirical evidence on the earnings management explanation is mixed.
We show that strategic analyst forecast pessimism provides an important alternative
explanation. Strategic forecast pessimism refers to sell-side analysts understating
their public forecasts relative to their private expectations about a firm’s earnings.
Incentives to issue pessimistic forecasts are rooted in analysts’ relations with firms’
management (e.g., Francis and Philbrick 1993; Lim 2001). One way in which
analysts can maintain good relations with managers is by slightly understating their
forecasts and thus helping firms meet or just beat expectations. Empirical studies
show that analysts obtain informational benefits from such behavior, by document-
ing relations between forecast pessimism and analysts’ subsequent forecast
accuracy and career outcomes (Ke and Yu 2006; Hilary and Hsu 2013). Recent
research also suggests that, even after SEC Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD),
private communication with management remains widespread and continues to
figure in analyst research (Brown et al. 2015).1
Our premise is that ex ante forecast pessimism (i.e., the forecast is lower than the
analyst’s expectation) can differ from ex post forecast pessimism (i.e., a positive
earnings surprise) because analysts generally face uncertainty about the earnings
outcome. This uncertainty can be defined as the imprecision of the information
signals analysts use when generating a point estimate earnings expectation. This
precision is determined by both the precision of public information (i.e., the
predictability of earnings given publicly available information) and the precision of
analysts’ unique private information.
When analysts’ information about earnings is relatively precise, the range of
earnings outcomes around their point estimate is relatively small. A smaller range
leads to a greater likelihood that a slightly understated forecast will actually induce
1 Evidence in studies such as those of Soltes (2014), Green et al. (2014), and Brown et al. (2015) suggests
that private communication between managers and analysts occurs frequently post-Reg FD. Even if
managers do not selectively disclose material private information, analysts can still benefit from
nonverbal cues and nonmaterial information disclosures that are valuable in combination with their
private information. For instance, Mayew (2008) shows in a post-Reg FD setting that managers reward
supportive analysts by allowing them to ask questions during conference calls. Asking questions allows
these analysts to convert the public information revealed from management’s responses into material
private information. We conclude that analysts’ incentives to please management and obtain access to
information remain important post-Reg FD.
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a positive surprise when earnings are announced.2 Thus, given the incentives to
please managers, the ability of analysts to be strategically pessimistic relates
positively to the precision of their information. Accordingly, we hypothesize that
the likelihood that a firm’s earnings just beat analyst expectations (i.e., the firm
reports a small positive earnings surprise) is negatively associated with earnings
forecast uncertainty.
We test our hypothesis using a large sample of U.S. firms’ quarterly earnings
surprises over the period 1993–2013. Earnings forecast uncertainty is measured
using analyst forecast dispersion, which is the standard deviation of individual
analysts’ latest forecasts before earnings announcements (e.g., Barron and Stuerke
1998; Clement et al. 2003). In initial descriptive analyses, we document a strong
link between the sign of small earnings surprises and levels of earnings forecast
uncertainty. Specifically, we find that earnings that ultimately just beat analyst
expectations are associated with substantially lower forecast dispersion before
earnings announcements than earnings that just miss expectations. The average
dispersion in firm-quarters with an earnings surprise of –1 cents or –2 cents per
share is about 50 % higher than the average dispersion in firm-quarters with a small
positive surprise of similar magnitude.
We formally test our hypothesis using a multiple logistic regression framework
that explains the likelihood that firms report a small positive (1 or 2 cents) versus a
small negative (–1 or –2 cents) earnings surprise, and control for an array of other
determinants of earnings surprises. Regression results reveal a strong negative
relation between earnings forecast uncertainty and the likelihood that firms just beat
instead of just miss analyst expectations. This relation is statistically and
economically highly significant and—given the link between uncertainty and
analysts’ ability to issue slightly pessimistic forecasts—supports the notion that
strategic forecast pessimism helps shape the distribution of earnings surprises
around zero.
We also examine other subsets of the earnings surprise distribution that are
commonly used to capture earnings management. We predict that earnings forecast
uncertainty becomes even more salient when considering the likelihood that a firm
reports a 0 or 1 cent earnings surprise because, statistically, firms are more likely to
report a small earnings surprise when analysts face little uncertainty. When we
introduce variables that capture whether firms report a 0 or 1 cent surprise relative to
(1) all other surprises and (2) all negative surprises, respectively, the empirical
results confirm that the relation with earnings forecast uncertainty strengthens. For
instance, we find that an inter-quartile reduction in forecast dispersion increases the
conditional probability that a firm reports a 0 or 1 cent surprise from 14 to 35 %.
2 To illustrate this argument, consider the case where an analyst’s point-estimate is 20 cents, with an
expected range of possible earnings outcomes of 18–22 cents per share (i.e., relatively low uncertainty).
Assume the analyst is willing to induce strategic pessimism of 2 cents per share. In this case, the
likelihood that a forecast understated by 2 cents per share will result in a positive earnings surprise is
high. (The firm is expected to meet or beat the 18 cents estimate.) In contrast, at the same level of
strategic pessimism of 2 cents per share, this likelihood is much lower in the case where the expected
range of possible earnings outcomes would be 0–40 cents per share (i.e., relatively high uncertainty).
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We illustrate the implications of our findings by examining potential research
settings that make use of the above subsets of the earnings surprise distribution.
Specifically, we examine the consequences of controlling for earnings forecast
uncertainty for the relation between small positive earnings-surprise incidence and
variables that capture constraints on firms’ ability to manage earnings. We show that
each of these variables is both negatively related to small positive surprise incidence
and positively related to forecast dispersion. After controlling for dispersion, most
of the significant relations with small positive earnings-surprise incidence disappear.
In other words, controlling for analysts’ ability to strategically issue pessimistic
forecasts can overturn conclusions about earnings management.
We do several additional tests that rule out alternative explanations. First, we
introduce an alternative measure of earnings forecast uncertainty that exploits
information on the relative precision of individual analysts’ prior forecasts issued
for other firms and again find a strong negative association with the likelihood of
small positive earnings surprises. Second, we show that our results are not driven by
firms’ use of (and ability to use) earnings management, expectations management,
or the relation between dispersion and future firm performance. Third, we show that
our findings are not simply an artifact of previously documented relations between
uncertainty and analyst forecast optimism.
This study contributes to the earnings discontinuity literature.3 The common
explanation for the asymmetry in the earnings surprise distribution is earnings
management, although empirical evidence for this explanation is limited and
mixed.4 Durtschi and Easton (2005) provide an alternative perspective and interpret
the earnings surprise distribution in terms of the magnitude of optimistic versus
pessimistic analyst forecast errors. They show that pessimistic forecast errors are
smaller than optimistic ones, and conclude that forecast error patterns provide an
alternative explanation for the asymmetry around zero earnings surprise: positive
surprises cluster around zero, while negative surprises spread away from zero. By
showing how forecast uncertainty maps into both the magnitude and sign of forecast
errors, we provide an explanation for why forecast pessimism is concentrated in
smaller earnings surprises.
Our findings have important implications for research designs that employ the
incidence of zero and small positive earnings surprises to capture constructs related
3 By focusing on earnings surprises, our research differs fundamentally from prior work debating the
validity of economic versus artifactual explanations for ‘‘discontinuities’’ around zero earnings and zero
earnings change (Durtschi and Easton 2005, 2009; Jorgensen et al. 2014; Burgstahler and Chuk 2015).
4 See Dechow et al. (2010, 364–366) for an overview of the mixed and mostly indirect evidence on the
earnings management explanation. Badertscher et al. (2012) examine restatement firms that have likely
managed earnings and find no evidence of elevated discretionary accruals for the 0 and ?1 cent earnings
surprise bins. Moreover, they conclude: ‘‘Roughly 55 % of the observations where earnings are deemed
to be opportunistically managed do not fall into the zero or just beat (0.01) earnings surprise bins that are
typically used to infer earnings management. Thus, these cases would be missed in studies that use the
zero bin and the bin just to the right of zero to infer earnings management’’ (pp. 346–347). The survey
evidence of Brown et al. (2015) further suggests that sell-side analysts do not support the common
conjecture that firms’ consistent meeting or beating of expectations is a red flag for financial misreporting.
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to earnings management.5 We show that these designs are more likely to sort
samples based on earnings forecast uncertainty than on earnings management, and
that controlling for dispersion can materially change inferences in settings where a
variable of interest relates to uncertainty. We expect these implications to apply to a
wider range of settings, given that variables of interest are commonly related to a
firm’s information environment. Moreover, the relation between forecast uncer-
tainty and the sign of earnings surprises is likely to be important for studies that rely
on signed earnings surprises in other contexts, such as when modeling pre-
dictable variation in analysts’ forecast errors (e.g., Hughes et al. 2008; Mohanram
and Gode 2013; So 2013).
2 Background and hypothesis development
Degeorge et al. (1999) document a strong asymmetry around zero in the frequency
distribution of U.S. firms’ quarterly earnings surprises and show that firms are
substantially more likely to just beat rather than just miss analyst forecasts. Brown
(2001) finds this asymmetry has strengthened over time, and Dechow et al. (2003)
find a similar pattern for annual earnings surprises. The financial media also
commonly acknowledge the tendency of firms to beat rather than miss analyst
earnings forecasts, even in economic downturns when firms’ earnings are weak
(Zweig 2011; Jakab 2013).
In this study, we examine the role of predictable variation in sell-side analyst
forecast errors in explaining this phenomenon. Forecast errors arise because the
information analysts use to generate their forecasts is not perfect. Analysts have
incentives to minimize their forecast errors by generating and acquiring better
information, as prior research suggests that forecast accuracy matters to them
because of career and reputational concerns.6 This suggests that rational analysts
can be expected to issue forecasts that reflect their best estimate of a firm’s future
earnings.
At the same time, analysts face incentives to issue forecasts that deviate from
their best estimate (e.g., Lim 2001; Hong and Kubik 2003). Such strategically
biased forecasts may arise from analysts’ attempts to win trading commissions for
the brokerages they work for (e.g., Cowen et al. 2006), from efforts to acquire
5 Variables based on the incidence of zero and small positive earnings surprises are commonly used to
empirically proxy for constructs such as earnings management (e.g., Cheng and Warfield 2005; Brochet
et al. 2015; Fang et al. 2015) and audit quality (e.g., Lim and Tan 2008; Reichelt and Wang 2010). Zero
and small positive earnings surprises are also used to select samples of ‘‘suspect’’ firms (Balsam et al.
2002; Cohen et al. 2008). Other studies rely on the likelihood of firms reporting a nonnegative earnings
surprise regardless of magnitude (e.g., Matsumoto 2002) or the likelihood of meeting/just beating versus
just missing expectations (e.g., McVay et al. 2006).
6 Although analysts are generally not directly compensated for their forecast accuracy, prior research
finds that larger errors (relative to analysts’ peers) are associated with greater analyst turnover (Mikhail
et al. 1999; Groysberg et al. 2011), while smaller errors are associated with promotions (Hong and Kubik
2003) and Institutional Investor All-Star rankings (Stickel 1992; Leone and Wu 2007). In addition,
analysts face incentives to protect their reputations with clients by issuing accurate forecasts (Jackson
2005; Cowen et al. 2006; Ljungqvist et al. 2007; Fang and Yasuda 2009).
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investment banking deals (e.g., Lin and McNichols 1998), and from attempts to
ingratiate themselves with firm managers to obtain privileged access to information
(e.g., Francis and Philbrick 1993). For instance, Lim (2001) models analysts’ trade-
off between issuing their best-estimate forecasts and issuing biased forecasts that
increase access to management. Access to management increases the precision of
analysts’ estimates and thereby reduces expected forecast errors.
Whether strategic forecast bias is optimistic (i.e., the forecast is above the
analyst’s best estimate) or pessimistic (i.e., the forecast is below the best estimate)
depends on analysts’ specific incentives and the forecast horizon. Brokerage trading
commissions and investment banking typically induce incentives for forecast
optimism.7 Incentives to please managers lead to both optimism in long-horizon
forecasts to support high market valuations (Dechow et al. 2000; Bradshaw et al.
2006) and pessimism in short-horizon forecasts to help firms meet or beat
expectations. Ke and Yu (2006) and Hilary and Hsu (2013) present empirical
evidence suggesting that analysts obtain benefits from short-horizon pessimism in
terms of greater access to management and more consistent and influential forecasts.
Meeting analysts’ earnings expectations matters to firms because of the negative
consequences of missing expectations (e.g., Skinner and Sloan 2002; Frankel et al.
2010). In addition, managers prefer small positive earnings surprises and therefore
slightly understated analyst earnings forecasts. Survey evidence by Graham et al.
(2005) suggests that managers believe that large earnings surprises negatively
influence investor perceptions of the predictability of firm performance and increase
the cost of capital. Based on their interviews with CFOs, Graham et al. (2005, 43)
note, ‘‘When asked about whether they would prefer to meet or to beat the earnings
target, several CFOs say they would rather meet (or slightly beat) the earnings target
rather than positively surprising the market in a big way every quarter.’’
The costs that firms incur from more volatile earnings surprises are unlikely to be
overcome by the benefits of reporting large positive surprises, for two reasons. First,
Freeman and Tse (1992) document that the marginal stock price benefits of beating
expectations decrease sharply with the magnitude of earnings surprises. In other
words, the marginal benefits to managers of beating expectations by a large versus a
small amount are much smaller than the marginal benefits of meeting versus missing
expectations.8 Second, stock prices respond to analyst forecast revisions (e.g., Lys
and Sohn 1990; Stickel 1991), which implies that when analysts are overly
pessimistic before earnings announcements, the negative pricing effects of
understated forecasts are likely to outweigh the positive consequences of beating
expectations by a greater margin.
7 While both forecast optimism and pessimism can induce trading commissions when triggering investor
belief revision, the effect is stronger for forecast optimism. Cowen et al. (2006) argue this is due to
constraints on, and costs of, short-selling. Beyer and Guttman (2011) show that as a result of investor risk
aversion, analysts are more likely to bias their forecasts upward in response to trading incentives.
8 In this regard, theoretical work such as that of Beyer (2008) assumes that managers’ utility with respect
to meeting versus missing expectations is asymmetric. In her study, managers are assumed to be
indifferent between meeting and beating analysts’ expectations, while the costs of missing expectations
increase with the amount of the miss.
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Given managers’ preference for small positive earnings surprises, the extent to
which analysts can please managers depends on their ability to induce such
surprises. This ability, in turn, depends on the precision of analysts’ information.
Consider the contrast between the required strategic bias for a firm with relatively
low uncertainty—for example, with an expected range of possible earnings
outcomes of 18–22 cents per share—and the required strategic bias for a firm with
relatively high uncertainty—for example, with an expected range of possible
earnings outcomes of 0–40 cents per share. Assume the analyst privately has an ex
ante 20 cents point estimate expectation for both firms (i.e., the mid-point of both
ranges). To obtain a similar probability of a small positive earnings surprise for both
firms ex post, the analyst would have to pessimistically bias the forecast for the high
uncertainty firm by a much larger amount than for the low uncertainty firm. Such
larger bias is costly to the analyst because of the expected increase in forecast error.
As a result, the analyst’s forecast is much less likely to display ex post pessimism
for the high uncertainty firm than for the low uncertainty firm.
To summarize, given the existence of incentives for analysts to induce strategic
pessimism in their forecasts, we posit that analysts’ ability to slightly understate
their forecasts and please managers is greater when their information signals about a
firm’s future earnings are more precise. We therefore predict that when earnings
forecast uncertainty is relatively low, firms are more likely to report earnings that
just beat rather than just miss consensus analyst expectations. Our main hypothesis
is stated below (in alternative form):
H1 The likelihood that a firm reports earnings that just beat instead of just miss
consensus analyst expectations is negatively related to earnings forecast uncertainty.
3 Research design
3.1 Sample selection
Table 1 presents the sample selection procedure. Our initial sample consists of all
quarterly earnings per share (EPS) forecasts in the I/B/E/S unadjusted detail file for
U.S. firms with fiscal quarters ending in 1993–2013.9 We require actual EPS data
from I/B/E/S and retain each analyst’s latest forecast before the quarterly earnings
announcement. The sample is restricted to firm-quarters with at least three
individual forecasts, as in, for example, Ke and Yu (2006). We drop late earnings
announcements that occur more than 180 calendar days after fiscal quarter-end, and,
following standard I/B/E/S methodology, we remove stale forecasts made more than
180 days before the quarterly earnings announcement.10 We merge the I/B/E/S
9 The sample period starts in 1993 because, until the early 1990s, I/B/E/S data suffer from a mismatch
between the definitions of forecasted and actual earnings (Cohen et al. 2007).
10 We impose the 180-day restriction for earnings announcement timing because some earnings
announcements in the I/B/E/S data are extremely delayed relative to the fiscal quarter-end, reflecting
either extreme cases of firms in trouble or data errors. Our results are not sensitive to excluding this
restriction or using alternative numbers of days.
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sample with CRSP and Compustat and restrict the sample to firms that have
nonnegative total assets and are listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. We delete
utilities and financial services firms (SIC codes 4400–4999 and 6000–6499) and
obtain a final sample of 118,730 firm-quarter observations after eliminating
observations with missing data to compute our main regression variables.11
The quarterly earnings surprise (SURPRISE) is defined as actual EPS less our
consensus forecast, which is calculated as the mean of individual analysts’ latest
EPS forecasts.12 Before taking the difference between actual earnings and the
consensus forecast, both figures are rounded to cents per share to ensure consistency
Table 1 Sample selection
Description No. obs.
Panel A: Initial selection of earnings surprise sample
One-quarter-ahead forecasts of EPS on I/B/E/S 1993–2013 (‘‘FPI’’ = 6) 2,486,904
Less: Analyst code missing or equal to 0 or 1, or CUSIP code missing -24,694
Less: No CUSIP-PERMNO match with CRSP ‘‘stocknames’’ file -39,207
Less: Missing actual EPS value or announcement date on I/B/E/S -15,511
Less: Earnings announcement date more than 180 days after fiscal quarter end -4906
Less: Individual forecast more than 180 days before earnings announcement date -22,995
Less: Retain only last forecast by each individual analyst -640,562
Cleaned sample of individual forecasts 1,739,029
Unique firm-quarters with earnings surprise data 301,027
Panel B: Final sample of firm-quarters
Firm-quarters in CRSP/COMPUSTAT with positive total assets 1993–2013 463,527
Less: Missing SIC code or exchange code on CRSP -417
Less: Firm not listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ -3473
Less: Utilities and financial firms (SIC codes 4400–4999 and 6000–6499) -94,722
Less: Missing data for control variables in COMPUSTAT -51,919
Less: No quarterly earnings surprise data available on I/B/E/S -120,041
CRSP/COMPUSTAT firm-quarters with I/B/E/S earnings surprise data 192,955
Less: Missing prior return (CRSP) and firm-specific ERC data -28,320
Less: Fewer than three individual analyst forecasts available for firm-quarter -45,905
Final sample of firm-quarter observations 118,730
EPS forecast and actual data are obtained from the I/B/E/S unadjusted detail files. We include all fiscal
quarters ending in the first calendar quarter of 1993 through the fourth calendar quarter of 2013
11 To adjust for stock splits between the analyst forecast and earnings announcement dates, cumulative
stock split factors are obtained from CRSP and merged separately with the forecast and announcement
dates. If the cumulative split factor at the forecast date differs from the cumulative split factor at the
earnings announcement date, the forecast of earnings per share is multiplied by the ratio of the cumulative
price adjustment factor at the announcement date to the cumulative price adjustment factor at the forecast
date. This ensures that differences in split levels do not erroneously drive firms towards (or away from)
zero earnings surprise.
12 We focus on unscaled earnings surprises per share, because managers and the investment community
are mainly concerned with earnings per share rather than scaled earnings numbers. Also, Degeorge et al.
(1999) and Cheong and Thomas (2011) show that earnings surprise magnitude does not vary with scale
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with the presentation of these numbers in press releases and financial media. Based
on SURPRISE, we create three dependent variables.
The first variable captures the incidence of small positive versus negative
surprises. Just beat versus just miss is an indicator variable that equals 1 for positive
1 and 2 cent earnings surprises and 0 for small negative surprises of 1 or 2 cents per
share. Although we are unaware of prior literature using this specific classification,
it is best suited in our setting to test H1. The design of Singer and You (2011) comes
closest to our classification, except theirs focuses on price-scaled earnings surprises.
McVay et al. (2006), Brown and Pinello (2007), and Shon and Veliotis (2013) do
focus on unscaled surprises, but they include 0 cent surprises as small ‘‘beats.’’ Our
choice to focus on 1 and 2 cent surprises, though arbitrary, is driven by our
motivation to obtain a reasonable small interval around zero while also maintaining
enough observations for the analyses. Results are not affected by choosing
alternative intervals around zero and extend to examining positive versus negative
surprises of any magnitude.
Given managers’ (Graham et al. 2005), investors’ (Keung et al. 2010), and
academics’ emphasis on zero and small earnings surprises, we also create a variable
Meet/just beat versus all other, which is an indicator variable that equals 1 for 0 and
1 cent earnings surprises and 0 for all other surprises (e.g., Cheng and Warfield
2005; Lim and Tan 2008; Brochet et al. 2015). We create a similar variable, Meet/
just beat versus miss, that equals 0 only for negative earnings surprise observations.
This classification comports with studies such as that of McVay et al. (2006), except
that it includes misses of any magnitude in the 0 category. This variable can provide
important additional insights, since a common assumption is that firms would have
missed expectations in the absence of earnings management.
3.2 Measuring earnings forecast uncertainty
Earnings forecast uncertainty is measured as the dispersion in the individual
analysts’ forecasts used to construct the consensus forecast (DISP). The intuition for
this measurement is that when analysts’ information precision increases, forecast
dispersion decreases. Dispersion has been widely used in the literature as an
empirical proxy for forecast uncertainty (e.g., Barron and Stuerke 1998; Kinney
et al. 2002; Clement et al. 2003; Ke and Yu 2006). Consistent with our focus on
unscaled earnings surprises, we use the unscaled standard deviation measured in
cents per share (Cheong and Thomas 2011).13
The use of dispersion as a measure of earnings forecast uncertainty has benefits
and drawbacks. A clear advantage of dispersion is that it is an ex ante measure and
available in real-time (Sheng and Thevenot 2012). Other proxies, such as realized
earnings volatility, rely on time-series data and result in stale measures of
Footnote 12 continued
(i.e., share price). This lack of variation in scale results in an asymmetry around zero in both the unscaled
and scaled distributions.
13 Our results are qualitatively similar if we scale the standard deviation of forecasts by the absolute
value of the consensus, i.e., use the coefficient of variation (Diether et al. 2002).
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uncertainty. A drawback of dispersion is that it is not a perfect measure of earnings
forecast uncertainty (Barry and Jennings 1992; Abarbanell et al. 1995; Sheng and
Thevenot 2012). In addition, while our study focuses on the uncertainty faced by
individual analysts, the use of dispersion hinges on the assumption that inter-analyst
variation in forecasts captures average intra-analyst uncertainty.
Barron et al. (1998) show how dispersion is conceptually related to earnings
forecast uncertainty, and Barron and Stuerke (1998) provide empirical evidence that
validates the use of dispersion as a proxy for earnings forecast uncertainty.14
Evidence suggesting that lower quality disclosures are associated with greater
dispersion (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Lehavy et al. 2011; Rajgopal and
Venkatachalam 2011) further supports the link between dispersion and the precision
of the information available to the average analyst. Lahiri and Sheng (2010) and
Sheng and Thevenot (2012) provide evidence suggesting that dispersion approx-
imates earnings forecast uncertainty for short-horizon forecasts, the forecasts we
consider in this study.
3.3 Control variables
Prior studies show that firm size relates to forecast accuracy (Lang and Lundholm
1996) and analyst optimism (Das et al. 1998). We therefore control for the natural
logarithm of market value of equity (MV) at the beginning of the fiscal quarter to
control for firm size. Also, the evidence of Skinner and Sloan (2002) suggests that
growth firms are associated with asymmetrically negative stock market reactions to
negative earnings surprises, which implies that growth is associated with managers’
incentives to avoid missing expectations. We control for growth using the book-to-
market ratio (BTM) at the end of the previous fiscal quarter and a variable that
captures the fraction of the most recent eight quarterly earnings numbers that exceed
earnings of the same quarter in the previous year (GROWTH).
We further control for market-based incentives to meet expectations by including
fixed effects for each of the 84 calendar quarters in our sample, because the
incidence and market reward for zero or small positive earnings surprises vary over
the sample period (Keung et al. 2010).15 Next, we calculate a firm-specific measure
14 Barron et al. (1998) show that the expected squared error in consensus (average) forecasts can be
viewed as the sum of common uncertainty and 1/N times idiosyncratic uncertainty (where N is the number
of analysts). If uncertainty is not purely idiosyncratic, the earnings forecast uncertainty faced by
individual analysts is expected to increase consensus forecast error magnitude. At the same time, even if
uncertainty is purely idiosyncratic, which maps into forecast dispersion, our sample’s median firm-quarter
has seven analysts issuing a forecast. This suggests that idiosyncratic uncertainty is unlikely to be fully
diversified in the consensus for the average firm-quarter. Also, prior empirical research confirms that
forecast dispersion is positively associated with the magnitude of earnings surprises (e.g., Kinney et al.
2002).
15 We include calendar-quarter fixed effects as opposed to fiscal-quarter fixed effects because one firm’s
first fiscal quarter can occur at a different point in time than another firm’s first fiscal quarter. Controlling
for calendar-quarter fixed effects allows us to better capture general time trends. Nevertheless, results are
virtually the same when using fiscal-quarter fixed effects.
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of stock price sensitivity to earnings news based on the earnings response coefficient
(ERC) obtained from firm-specific time-series regressions of earnings announce-
ment returns on earnings surprises. Kinney et al. (2002) show that ERCs are larger
for firms with lower forecast dispersion, which implies stronger stock price declines
when firms miss expectations and dispersion is relatively low. Higher ERCs imply
greater price sensitivity to earnings news and potentially greater incentives to meet
expectations.
Managers have incentives to meet expectations and maintain high stock prices
around mergers and acquisitions (M&As). For instance, the evidence of Erickson
and Wang (1999) suggests firms manage earnings around M&As to inflate stock
prices in stock-for-stock mergers. At the same time, Erickson et al. (2012) show that
M&A announcements lead to increases in forecast dispersion. We control for
M&As by creating an indicator variable capturing whether or not M&A
announcements take place in the 90 days before the quarterly earnings announce-
ment (MNA). We further control for managers’ trading incentives to meet
expectations (Richardson et al. 2004; McVay et al. 2006) by controlling for
seasoned equity offering (SEO) and insider selling (INSELL) activity. We control
for institutional ownership (INST), because Matsumoto (2002) suggests that
managerial incentives to avoid missing expectations increase with institutional
ownership.
Prior research suggests that, on average, analysts’ forecasts do not fully
incorporate public news (e.g., Lys and Sohn 1990; Abarbanell 1991). We control for
prior news by including variables that capture firms’ recent stock price performance
(LAGRET) and the prior quarter’s seasonally differenced earnings change
(LAGDQEPS). If analysts underreact to news, these variables will be positively
correlated with the earnings surprise, because analyst underreaction to good (bad)
news should lead to a forecast that is too low (high), which induces a positive
(negative) earnings surprise.
We also control for the number of shares outstanding (SHRS), because earnings
surprises more easily round to zero when a greater number of shares is used to
compute EPS. Although forecast errors and dispersion tend not to vary with price
per share (Cheong and Thomas 2011), we also include the natural logarithm of
lagged price to control for any unobserved scale-related effects (PRICE). Since a
rounded zero earnings surprise can also be driven by stock splits over the prior
period, we control for splits over the year before the earnings announcement
(SPLIT). We further control for the natural logarithm of analyst following by
including NUMEST, the number of analysts contributing to our consensus. Lastly,
HORIZON controls for the average age of the forecasts in the consensus. This
control is included because late-quarter revisions in forecasts are more likely
influenced by guidance (e.g., Richardson et al. 2004), and because later forecasts are
likely to be based on more precise information than forecasts made earlier in the
quarter.




Panel A of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on earnings surprises and our
dependent variables.16 The median firm-quarter has a positive earnings surprise of 1
cent per share. The first and third quartile values of SURPRISE are -1 and ?4 cents,
respectively. These figures corroborate the asymmetry in the earnings-surprise
distribution and comport with other studies (Cheong and Thomas 2014). Just beat
versus just miss equals 1 for 67.5 % of observations, while 26.3 % of sample firm-
quarters have a 0 or 1 cent earnings surprise (Meet/just beat vs. all other). Meet/just
beat versus miss equals 1 in 47.5 % of cases, which suggests zero and small positive
earnings surprises occur almost as frequently as negative surprises of any amount.
Panel B presents means of forecast dispersion by cents of earnings surprise. We
find a strong V-shaped pattern for DISP across the earnings surprise distribution,
which supports the use of forecast dispersion as a proxy for the average precision of
information in analysts’ forecasts. Greater dispersion is associated with larger (ex
post) earnings surprises. More importantly, there is a strong asymmetry in the
V-shape based on the average dispersion for positive versus negative earnings
surprises. Small negative surprises are associated with greater forecast uncertainty
than small positive earnings surprises. The average dispersion in the -1 and -2
cents bins (2.754) is about 50 % higher than the average dispersion in the ?1 and
?2 cents bins (1.868). This difference is statistically highly significant. As a result
of the asymmetry, we find that the 0 and ?1 cent earnings surprise bins are
associated with the lowest dispersion.
Figure 1 presents graphical evidence on the link between dispersion and small
earnings surprises. Panel A visualizes the strongly asymmetric nature of the
V-shaped relation between earnings surprises and forecast dispersion around zero
earnings surprise. Panel B illustrates the relation between dispersion and the
likelihood that firms just beat versus just miss expectations. When uncertainty is
lowest (i.e., dispersion decile 1), firms are more likely to just beat instead of just
miss expectations. As uncertainty increases, the likelihood of just beating versus just
missing decreases monotonically. In fact, firms in the highest two deciles are more
likely to just miss instead of just beat expectations. Focusing on 0 and ?1 cent
surprises relative to all other surprises and negative surprises, the strength of the
relation with dispersion increases.
Panel B of Table 2 further shows that the 0 and ?1 cent earnings surprise bins
are also associated with the lowest average BTM, highest GROWTH, highest ERC,
and most frequent MNA.17 Consistent with analyst underreaction to news, LAGRET
16 All continuous variables are winsorized to the 1st and 99th percentiles of their distributions. Our
results are qualitatively similar when we exclude extreme observations rather than winsorize them.
17 The firm-specific earnings response coefficients (ERC) based on time series data are relatively high
compared to those based on pooled samples in prior research but more consistent with values predicted by
theory. This finding is consistent with the evidence of, for example, Kinney et al. (2002) and Cheong and
Thomas (2014), who suggest that the pooling of observations across firms results in significant downward
biases in ERCs.
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and LAGDQEPS are positively correlated with small positive earnings surprises.
Zero and small positive surprises are also associated with the highest SHRS and
SPLIT, confirming that surprises round more easily to the target level with more
outstanding shares. HORIZON is greater for small positive versus small negative
























































Just beat vs. just miss
Meet/just beat vs. all other




Fig. 1 Relation between forecast dispersion and small earnings surprises. Panel A: Asymmetric
distribution of forecast dispersion across earnings surprise bins. Panel B: Frequency of zero and small
positive earnings surprises by deciles of forecast dispersion. Panel A is based on the 111,181 firm-quarters
with an absolute earnings surprise smaller than or equal to 20¢ per share. Panel B is based on the full
sample of 118,730 firm-quarters. See Table 1 for sample selection details. See the ‘‘Appendix’’ for
information on the construction of the forecast dispersion measure and the earnings surprise category
variables. Deciles based on forecast dispersion are constructed each calendar quarter
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are induced by late downward revisions in forecasts that result from expectations
management.18 All differences in average characteristics between small positive and
small negative surprise firm-quarters are statistically significant, as indicated by the
two rightmost columns of Panel B.
Due to the mechanical relations among MV, SHRS, and PRICE, untabulated
variance inflation factors indicate potential multicollinearity. Therefore, in our
analyses to follow, we exclude SHRS as a control variable. Results are qualitatively
similar regardless of whether SHRS is included. Variance inflation factors for the other
variables indicate no cause for concern. After excluding SHRS, the highest variance
inflation factor is only 1.65 (for PRICE). Due to the right-skewness in variables DISP,
MV, PRICE, and NUMEST, we use the natural logarithm of these variables in our
regression analyses.19 BecauseDISP can take on the value of zero, ln(DISP) is defined
as the natural logarithm of 0.001 plus the standard deviation in forecasts.20
4.2 Main results
Table 3 presents results of testing our hypothesis. All models are estimated using
logit regression, and standard errors are clustered by firm and time (year-quarter).
Estimation results indicate that forecast uncertainty (ln(DISP)) is significantly
negatively related to the likelihood of a small positive versus a small negative
earnings surprise. This finding supports H1 and suggests that, after controlling for
other determinants of earnings surprises, less forecast uncertainty is associated with
a greater likelihood that a firm reports earnings that just beat analyst expectations.
Focusing on the other two columns of Table 3, we find that the relation with
forecast uncertainty is also highly significant when we compare zero and small
positive earnings surprises to all other firm-quarters or to negative surprises.
Focusing on the coefficients on the control variables in the Just beat versus just
miss estimation, we find no evidence to suggest that the incidence of small positive
versus small negative earnings surprises is significantly associated with our
variables for management incentives to meet expectations. Of the incentive
variables, only INST is significantly positively associated with the likelihood of a
small positive versus a small negative surprise at p\ 0.05. The significant positive
coefficients on LAGRET and LAGDQEPS are consistent with earnings surprises
being partly determined by the staleness of information in the consensus forecast.
In Panel B, we quantify the effect of changing the variable of interest (ln(DISP))
on the conditional probability of a small positive earnings surprise. This test
measures the marginal effect of a change in earnings forecast uncertainty on the
18 The average HORIZON of[60 calendar days is consistent with most analysts issuing forecasts after
the previous quarterly earnings announcement.
19 Even though ERC is relatively right-skewed, we do not use its logarithm because the estimated
earnings response coefficient is negative for some firm-quarter observations. Nevertheless, our results are
qualitatively similar if we set negative values equal to zero and take the natural logarithm of ERC.
20 Our findings are not sensitive to this specific design choice. We obtain qualitatively highly similar
results when we i) split ln(DISP) into a variable that captures the log of dispersion when dispersion is
nonzero and an indicator variable for zero dispersion or ii) use the quarterly decile rank of dispersion as
the test variable.
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Table 3 Earnings forecast uncertainty and small positive earnings surprises
Logit regression
Dependent variable Just beat (1) versus just
miss (0)
Meet/just beat (1) versus
all other (0)
Meet/just beat (1) versus
miss (0)
Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat
Panel A: Regression results
ln(DISP) -0.524 -22.79*** -0.854 -55.63*** -1.079 -53.78***
ln(MV) 0.015 0.87 0.122 8.37*** 0.097 6.65***
BTM 0.053 1.10 -0.213 -5.74*** -0.191 -4.63***
GROWTH 0.085 1.49 0.389 9.03*** 0.385 7.91***
ERC 0.000 0.34 0.004 6.54*** 0.003 4.29***
MNA 0.003 0.10 0.093 4.21*** 0.087 3.49***
SEO -0.172 -1.12 -0.169 -1.92* -0.423 -3.57***
INSELL 0.102 1.93* 0.036 1.02 0.131 3.09***
INST 0.207 4.33*** 0.110 3.27*** 0.245 6.29***
LAGRET 1.241 15.76*** -0.332 -6.74*** 0.861 13.86***
LAGDQEPS 0.072 3.41*** 0.001 0.08 0.069 4.46***
ln(PRICE) 0.291 7.64*** -0.308 -13.84*** 0.011 0.32
SPLIT 0.121 2.43** -0.007 -0.26 0.105 2.67***
ln(NUMEST) 0.178 4.56*** 0.143 4.86*** 0.310 9.01***
HORIZON 0.006 7.86*** -0.003 -5.19*** 0.001 0.91
Quarter fixed effects Included Included Included
n 39,227 118,730 65,809
Pseudo R2 0.067 0.138 0.212
Dependent variable Just beat (1)
versus just miss (0)
Meet/just beat (1)
versus all other (0)
Meet/just beat (1)
versus miss (0)
Panel B: Marginal effects analysis
Probability with low DISP (p25 value) 0.730 0.346 0.638
Probability with high DISP (p75 value) 0.567 0.140 0.284
Difference p25-p75 0.163 0.206 0.354
Percentage difference 28.7 % 147.0 % 124.3 %
Probability with low DISP (p10 value) 0.777 0.445 0.748
Probability with high DISP (p90 value) 0.478 0.083 0.160
Difference p10-p90 0.299 0.361 0.589
Percentage difference 62.5 % 433.0 % 368.0 %
See Table 1 for sample selection details and the ‘‘Appendix’’ for variable descriptions. Test statistics are
calculated using standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering by firm and quarter. ***, **, and * reflect
statistical significance at the level of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively. Marginal effects are calculated as
the effect of an inter-quartile range (or 10th to 90th percentile) shift in ln(DISP) on the likelihood that the
dependent variable equals 1, while holding all other variables constant at their means. The number of
shares outstanding variable (SHRS) is excluded from the regressions to avoid multicollinearity problems
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likelihood of observing a small positive earnings surprise, while controlling for the
influence of other factors. Results suggest that an interquartile move from high to
low dispersion is associated with a 28.7 % increase in the conditional probability
that firms report a small positive instead of a small negative earnings surprise. When
we increase the magnitude of the shift in forecast dispersion from the 90th to the
10th percentile, this figure even increases to 62.5 %.21 Thus the relation we
document is not only statistically significant but also economically highly
significant.
The Meet/just beat versus all other indicator variable is affected by both the sign
and magnitude of analysts’ forecast errors, since greater forecast uncertainty is
associated with larger absolute forecast errors. Our results suggest that a move from
high to low earnings forecast uncertainty is associated with a large increase in the
conditional probability of identifying a zero or small positive earnings surprise from
14.0 to 34.6 %. That is, the odds that a firm is identified as meeting or just beating
expectations more than double. Similarly, a move from high to low forecast
uncertainty more than doubles the likelihood that a firm is identified as meeting or
just beating instead of missing expectations.
Overall, these findings provide strong support for our hypothesis and suggest that
variation in strategic analyst-forecast pessimism may explain the systematic
tendency of firms to report zero and small positive earnings surprises. This
conclusion follows from our conceptual reasoning in Sect. 2, which suggests that
variation in earnings forecast uncertainty allows us to empirically identify variation
in the analysts’ role in shaping small earnings surprises. Our findings are
particularly important for studies that use zero and small positive earnings surprises
as a screen for earnings management, since variables of interest are often correlated
with a firm’s information environment. Because earnings forecast uncertainty also
relates to the information environment, omitted correlated variable problems are
likely to arise if uncertainty is not controlled for. We illustrate this issue in the
following section.
4.3 Implications for research
We illustrate the implications of controlling for forecast uncertainty for relations
between earnings surprises and three variables identified as constraints on
managers’ ability to manage earnings: balance sheet ‘‘bloat’’ (Barton and Simko
2002), the fourth fiscal quarter (Brown and Pinello 2007), and analyst cash flow
forecasts (McInnis and Collins 2011).22 If these variables capture constraints on
21 To further gauge the strength of our findings, we also ran (untabulated) quarterly logit regressions. Out
of the 84 quarterly estimations, the coefficient on dispersion in the model explaining Just beat versus just
miss incidence is negative in 83 cases and significantly negative (p value\0.05) in 74 cases.
22 We extend, rather than replicate, these studies to illustrate the potential implications of our findings.
While Barton and Simko (2002) and Brown and Pinello (2007) focus on the association between earnings
management constraints and nonnegative earnings surprises, we focus on zero and small positive
surprises. In untabulated tests, we find the results of Barton and Simko (2002) and Brown and Pinello
(2007) to be robust when using an indicator for nonnegative earnings surprise as dependent variable and
controlling for forecast dispersion. Barton and Simko (2002) control for dispersion, while Brown and
Pinello (2007) control for the absolute forecast error. McInnis and Collins (2011) examine differences in
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earnings management and our dependent variables for zero and small positive
earnings surprise incidence measure variation in earnings management, we should
observe negative associations between the constraint variables and our dependent
variables. However, these variables are also conceptually related to earnings
forecast uncertainty.
Barton and Simko (2002) suggest that prior-period earnings management
translates from the income statement to the balance sheet as an overstatement of net
operating assets. A firms’ ability to manage earnings upward is therefore
constrained by the level of overstated net operating assets (balance sheet ‘‘bloat’’).
At the same time, balance sheet bloat is expected to be positively related to forecast
uncertainty because past earnings management deteriorates the quality of earnings.
Prior studies such as Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011) provide evidence
suggesting that earnings quality negatively relates to forecast dispersion.
Because the fourth fiscal quarter is subject to the annual audit, prior research
suggests that firms are more constrained in their ability to manage earnings in the
fourth quarter (Brown and Pinello 2007). At the same time, fourth quarter earnings
are likely to be more difficult to forecast, given relatively more unpredictable year-
end accounting adjustments. Consistent with this notion, Mikhail et al. (1997)
document significantly less accurate analyst forecasts in the fourth fiscal quarter.
Lastly, McInnis and Collins (2011) suggest that analysts’ initiation of cash flow
forecasts constrains managers’ ability to manage earnings to meet or beat
expectations. However, DeFond and Hung (2003) show that analysts are more
likely to forecast cash flows when earnings are volatile and difficult to predict.
Table 4, Panel A, presents descriptive statistics confirming that each of the three
earnings management constraint variables (continuous variable BLOAT, the
indicator variable Q4, and an indicator variable for cash flow forecasts, CFF) is
positively correlated with forecast dispersion. Mean dispersion is substantially
higher for firms in the highest quartile of balance sheet bloat (4.76) compared to
firms in the other three quartiles (3.45). The fourth fiscal quarter (Q4) is associated
with higher mean dispersion (4.06) than the other three quarters (3.68). Lastly,
average DISP for quarters with cash flow forecasts (4.43) is substantially higher
compared to firm-quarters without such forecasts (3.25).23
Panel B presents results of testing the relations of BLOAT, Q4, and CFF with our
dependent variables without controlling for dispersion but including our main set of
control variables. Consistent with the conjecture that balance sheet bloat constrains
firms’ ability to meet or just beat expectations, the coefficients on BLOAT are
significantly negative in the first and third specifications. Similarly, coefficients on
Q4 are significantly negative, suggesting it is more difficult to meet or just beat
Footnote 22 continued
the frequency of nonnegative earnings surprises around analysts’ cash flow forecast initiations. We
examine differences in the frequency of zero and small positive earnings surprises between firms with and
without cash flow forecasts. McInnis and Collins (2011) control for forecast uncertainty by matching their
treatment and control firms using earnings volatility as one of the covariates.
23 All differences in dispersion are statistically significant. The significant positive associations between
DISP and BLOAT, Q4, and CFF are robust to controlling for our firm characteristic control variables in a
multiple OLS regression.
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expectations in the fourth fiscal quarter. The coefficient on CFF is significantly
negative in the second and third specifications, suggesting the ability to meet or just
beat expectations is constrained by analysts’ cash flow forecasts.
In Panel C, we control for dispersion and no longer find negative significant
coefficients for five out of seven cases that were significantly negative in Panel B.
For BLOAT, the coefficient in the meet/just beat specification even switches from
statistically insignificant to significantly positive. For Q4 and CFF, all coefficient
estimates turn insignificant after we control for dispersion. These findings highlight













Panel A: Relation between forecast dispersion and variables for constraints on earnings management
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versus just miss (0)
Meet/just beat (1)
versus all other (0)
Meet/just beat (1)
versus miss (0)
Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat
Panel B: Relation between earnings management constraints and meeting/just beating before dispersion
controls
BLOAT -0.016 -5.90*** 0.000 0.17 -0.012 -4.30***
Q4 -0.110 -3.08*** -0.091 -3.53*** -0.188 -6.84***
CFF -0.017 -0.39 -0.092 -2.78*** -0.099 -2.52**
Control variables Included Included Included
Quarter fixed effects Included Included Included
n 38,610 116,839 64,708
Pseudo R2 0.042 0.058 0.094
Panel C: Relation between earnings management constraints and meeting/just beating after dispersion
controls
BLOAT -0.015 -5.08*** 0.006 3.35*** -0.008 -3.80***
Q4 -0.053 -1.44 0.022 0.95 -0.024 -0.93
CFF 0.026 0.62 -0.013 -0.44 0.020 0.57
ln(DISP) -0.526 -23.07*** -0.857 -55.51*** -1.084 -54.38***
Control variables Included Included Included
Quarter fixed effects Included Included Included
n 38,610 116,839 64,708
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.138 0.213
Analyses are based on a reduced sample of 116,839 firm-quarters with available data to compute BLOAT.
See Table 1 for sample selection details and the ‘‘Appendix’’ for variable descriptions. Test statistics are
calculated using standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering by firm and quarter. ***, **, and * reflect
statistical significance at the level of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively
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that, given our previous findings on the importance of forecast uncertainty in
explaining the incidence of zero and small positive earnings surprises, researchers
should consider controlling for forecast uncertainty when examining variables that
capture the incidence of small positive (and zero) earnings surprises.
5 Additional analyses
5.1 Alternative uncertainty measure
To assess the robustness of our main findings, we introduce a different measure of
earnings forecast uncertainty. Specifically, we measure the uncertainty component
of each analyst’s private information by computing the average individual (relative)
forecast ability of analysts in the consensus. For each firm-quarter, we first identify
the individual analysts that contribute to a consensus forecast. For each of these
analysts, we calculate the fraction of all their absolute forecast errors over the
preceding 5 years (excluding forecasts for firm i) that exceeded the median absolute
consensus forecast error. We then define a new variable, INACCR, as the firm-
quarter average of these figures across the individual analysts that contribute to the
consensus forecast for the current firm-quarter.
Panel A of Table 5 replicates the descriptive analysis of Table 2, Panel B, for our
alternative measure of earnings forecast uncertainty. We compute the quarterly
decile rank of this variable to enhance the interpretation of the variation in this
variable. Consistent with results for dispersion, the 0 and ?1 cent surprise bins are
associated with the lowest level of earnings forecast uncertainty based on our
alternative measure. In addition, average INACCR is significantly lower for small
positive earnings surprises, which confirms the prediction that firms are more likely
to report earnings that just beat expectations when analysts’ information is more
precise.
Panel B presents results of replicating our main tests using the alternative
measure. The coefficient on INACCR is significantly negative in each of the
estimations. For instance, results for the Just beat versus just miss specification
suggest that firms characterized by low uncertainty due to analysts’ (lack of) private
information (INACCR) are significantly more likely to report earnings that just beat
rather than just miss expectations. Overall, we conclude that these findings are
consistent with our results using forecast dispersion, and that they further support
our interpretation that variation in the precision of analysts’ information has
important implications for the likelihood of identifying firms reporting a (zero or)
small positive earnings surprise.
5.2 Earnings management as alternative explanation
The findings in Kinney et al. (2002) suggest that ERCs are substantially greater
when forecast dispersion is relatively low. This could imply that managers have
greater incentives to manage earnings to meet expectations when dispersion is
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low.24 If earnings management would explain our main findings, we should observe
(1) a significantly positive association between our dependent variables and
variables for earnings management, and (2) a significantly stronger (i.e., more
negative) relation between dispersion and our dependent variables in cases where
earnings management is observed. We test this alternative story in Panel A of
Table 6.
We measure earnings management using an indicator variable (AAER) that
captures whether a firm-quarter is identified as materially overstated in an SEC
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER) based on the extended
dataset of Dechow et al. (2011). Panel A of Table 6 shows that this AAER indicator
is significantly positively associated with the meet/just beat classification (Meet/just
beat vs. all other) but not with the incidence of a small positive versus a small
negative earnings surprise. Focusing on the interactions of dispersion with AAER,
we find that none of the coefficients is significantly negative. These results are not
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Panel A: Average rank of relative analyst information imprecision across earnings surprise bins
INACCR 6.143 5.589 5.292 4.868 4.905 5.051 5.773 4.967 5.405 -0.438***
Logit regression
Dependent variable Just beat (1)
versus just miss (0)
Meet/just beat (1)
versus all other (0)
Meet/just beat (1)
versus miss (0)
Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat
Panel B: Logit regression results with alternative measure
INACCR -0.047 -9.99*** -0.081 -20.40*** -0.096 -19.79***
Control variables Included Included Included
Quarter fixed effects Included Included Included
N 39,227 118,730 65,809
Pseudo R2 0.044 0.066 0.104
See Table 1 for sample selection details and the ‘‘Appendix’’ for variable descriptions. INACCR is the
decile rank of a firm-quarter measure based on the past relative (to other analysts in the consensus)
absolute forecast inaccuracy of individual analysts. A higher rank implies that the consensus is composed
by analysts with relatively lower (ex ante) information precision. Test statistics are calculated using
standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering by firm and quarter. ***, **, and * reflect statistical
significance at the level of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively
24 Payne and Robb (2000) argue that managers have more incentives to manage earnings to meet analyst
expectations when dispersion is low. They find a significant negative association between dispersion and
discretionary accruals and conclude that firms use more income-increasing earnings management tactics
when dispersion is low. However, the results of their tests do not support their additional conjecture that
firms use more income-increasing discretionary accruals to meet or beat expectations when dispersion is
low.
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consistent with the conjecture that our documented negative relation between
dispersion and small earnings surprise incidence is explained by earnings
management.25





versus just miss (0)
Meet/just beat (1)
versus all other (0)
Meet/just beat (1)
versus miss (0)
Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. z-stat
Panel A: Earnings management as moderating factor based on AAERs
ln(DISP) -0.565 -22.48*** -0.882 -52.63*** -1.122 -52.48***
AAER -0.078 -0.61 0.208 2.18** 0.093 0.81
ln(DISP)*AAER -0.203 -1.30 0.035 0.33 -0.027 -0.20
Control variables Included Included Included
Quarter fixed effects Included Included Included
n 28,287 78,101 45,898
Pseudo R2 0.079 0.137 0.218
Panel B: Expectations management as moderating factor based on public earnings guidance
ln(DISP) -0.456 -14.71*** -0.811 -41.91*** -0.993 -33.37***
GUIDE 0.166 4.01*** 0.137 5.34*** 0.379 10.25***
ln(DISP)*GUIDE -0.191 -4.89*** -0.008 -0.31 -0.106 -2.84***
Control variables Included Included Included
Quarter fixed effects Included Included Included
n 26,137 83,103 43,689
Pseudo R2 0.057 0.131 0.207
See Table 1 for sample selection details and the ‘‘Appendix’’ for variable descriptions. In Panel A, AAER
is an indicator variable capturing whether or not the firm-quarter had a material misstatement as identified
in an SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER). The AAER data are based on
misstatements which originally resulted in an overstatement of net income. AAER is set to missing for
fiscal quarters after 2007 due to limited data coverage. In Panel B, GUIDE is an indicator capturing
whether management issues earnings guidance for the fiscal-quarter end. This variable is used only for
fiscal quarters ending in the post-Reg FD period (i.e., fiscal quarters ending in November 2000 and later)
in order to capture public guidance. The interaction variables in Panels A and B are computed based on
mean-adjusted main effects to reduce the influence of multicollinearity. Test statistics are calculated using
standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering by firm and quarter. ***, **, and * reflect statistical
significance at the level of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively
25 In untabulated analyses, we also used alternative earnings-management variables based on
restatements. Specifically, we used indicator variables that capture whether the firm-quarter was
misstated as identified in a subsequent restatement, based on the Audit Analytics Non-Reliance
Restatement database. The key difference between the two variables is that the first captures all
restatements, while the second captures more severe restatements as indicated by SEC investigation,
indications of fraud, and class action lawsuits. For both restatement variables, we also find no significant
negative coefficients.
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5.3 The role of expectations management
Our study relates to research that suggests managers try to walk down analyst
expectations with guidance (i.e., expectations management). For instance, Cotter
et al. (2006) find that guidance reduces forecast dispersion and increases the
likelihood that firms meet or beat analyst expectations. Note, however, that our
prediction and findings should also hold in the absence of guidance. Uncertainty
before earnings announcements varies for reasons other than guidance, leading to
the same conceptual prediction that high uncertainty impairs analysts’ ability to
slightly understate their forecasts. Moreover, many firms do not issue guidance.
Nevertheless, we explore the role of earnings guidance in this section.
We examine the moderating effect of a variable that captures public guidance. If
guidance explains our findings, we should observe (1) a more negative association
between dispersion and our dependent variables when earnings guidance occurs,
and (2) no relation between dispersion and our dependent variables when earnings
guidance does not occur. To examine these predictions, we obtain data on public
guidance from the I/B/E/S Guidance database. Given data coverage and the
importance of public guidance post-Reg FD, we restrict the analyses to the period
starting in November 2000 (n = 83,103).26 Indicator variable GUIDE equals 1 for
firm-quarters for which earnings guidance was issued and 0 otherwise.
Panel B of Table 6 presents the results of running our main analyses with an
interaction term between dispersion and GUIDE. The negative and significant
coefficient on the interaction term is consistent with earnings guidance contributing
to our findings and suggests that guidance could be viewed as one of the
mechanisms through which forecast uncertainty predicts the likelihood of a small
positive earnings surprise. The coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant in
the specification that predicts firms’ incidence of zero and small positive surprises.
More importantly, the coefficient on dispersion remains strongly negative and
significant, which suggests that our results remain strong in cases where guidance is
not observed. We conclude that our findings are unlikely to be explained solely by
expectations management.
5.4 Other sensitivity analyses
5.4.1 Dispersion as proxy for a moving earnings target
Dispersion could also proxy for the difficulty managers face in managing earnings
to meet expectations. If lower dispersion captures a more stable earnings target that
is easier to identify, it could be associated with a greater ability to manage earnings.
26 Chuk et al. (2013) investigate the reliability of the widely used I/B/E/S (previously ‘‘CIG’’) data for
public guidance and find that these data suffer from coverage biases. They recommend that researchers
limit the use of data from years before 1998 and that they examine subsets of data to determine whether
results using the data are driven by coverage bias. Our focus is on post-Reg FD, which is consistent with
the first recommendation. Following the second recommendation, we find our results to be qualitatively
similar if we split our sample based on median analyst coverage. This suggests our results are not likely to
be driven by data coverage biases.
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To test this conjecture, we construct a new variable based on the variability in the
consensus forecast in the period before each firm-quarter’s earnings announcement.
Specifically, we compute a daily consensus for each of the 360 days before the
earnings announcement based on individual forecasts outstanding prior to that day.
We construct a variable TARGETVAR as a firm-quarter’s time series coefficient of
variation in the daily changes in the consensus forecast.
If ability to manage earnings explains our findings, we should observe a negative
association between TARGETVAR and the incidence of small positive earnings
surprises. Moreover, this relation should subsume the effect of dispersion. The first
regression in Panel A of Table 7 shows that dispersion and TARGETVAR are
significantly positively related. The second regression confirms the existence of a
significant negative association between TARGETVAR and the incidence of small
positive earnings surprises. However, after including dispersion in the rightmost
column, we find the coefficient on dispersion remains strongly negative, while the
coefficient on TARGETVAR switches from negative to positive. We therefore
conclude that it is unlikely that the ability to manage earnings, as a result of
variability in the earnings target to meet or beat, explains our main findings.
5.4.2 Dispersion and future firm performance
Minton et al. (2002) show that higher forecast uncertainty firms tend to have lower
future operating cash flows and earnings. To the extent that such lower performance
is not fully anticipated in analysts’ earnings forecasts, our findings could capture the
relation between uncertainty and ex post performance. To test this possibility, we
split our sample into quartile portfolios, each calendar quarter, based on ex post
earnings performance, and estimate our regressions for each of these portfolios.
Panel B of Table 7 presents results of these estimations and suggests our findings
are robust to partitioning on performance and are not driven by any particular
portfolio of performance. We conclude that our findings are not explained by the
link between forecast uncertainty and future performance.
5.4.3 Earnings forecast uncertainty and forecast optimism
Prior related research presents evidence on a relation between forecast uncertainty
and optimism in longer-horizon forecasts (Ackert and Athanassakos 1997; Das et al.
1998; Lim 2001). With longer-horizon forecasts, managers prefer analysts to be
overly optimistic (see the discussion in Sect. 2), and these prior studies conjecture
that analysts have more to gain from pleasing managers with forecast optimism
when uncertainty is relatively high. To test whether our findings are simply an
outcome of the previously documented empirical relation between uncertainty and
analysts’ forecast optimism, we use the same daily consensus forecasts as in
subsection 5.4.1 and analyze the correlation between dispersion and just beating
versus just missing over the forecast horizon.
Our prediction on forecast uncertainty and forecast pessimism implies that the
negative association between dispersion and small positive earnings surprise
incidence should be strongest based on forecasts measured just before the earnings
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announcement. This is because forecast pessimism is desirable for managers only
for those short-horizon forecasts. If, instead, the negative association between
dispersion and small positive earnings surprise incidence is simply an artifact of the
positive relation between uncertainty and forecast optimism, we should observe the
negative correlation to be driven by longer-horizon forecasts.
Figure 2 plots the cross-sectional correlation between dispersion and an indicator
variable for small positive versus small negative earnings surprise incidence for
each of the 360 days before the quarterly earnings announcement. The figure shows
that the relation between dispersion and small positive earnings surprise incidence is
driven by short-horizon forecasts. For longer-horizon forecasts, the correlation is
virtually zero. Shortly before the earnings announcement, however, the correlation
strengthens to around -0.23. These results are more consistent with the predicted
link between uncertainty and pessimism than with a link between uncertainty and
optimism. In addition, a plot of the indicator variable for small positive surprise
incidence itself reveals that the temporal pattern in small positive earnings surprise
frequency virtually mirrors that of the cross-sectional correlations. Overall, we
conclude that our findings are not an artifact of the previously documented











-360 -270 -180 -90 M












Calendar days relative to earnings announcement
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Fig. 2 Additional sensitivity test: Relation between forecast dispersion and small earnings surprises over
the forecast horizon. For each day in the period from 360 days to 1 day before the quarterly earnings
announcement date, a consensus (mean) forecast is computed based on outstanding individual forecasts.
For this purpose, we additionally use individual forecasts with ‘‘FPI’’ equal to 7 (two quarters ahead), 8
(three quarters ahead), 9 (four quarters ahead), and N (five quarters ahead), in order to construct a daily
consensus. At each point in time, we remove stale forecasts by including only forecasts made in the most
recent 180 days when computing the daily consensus. If multiple forecasts are found by the same analyst
for the same firm-quarter, only the last forecast is retained. The figure displays the daily Spearman
correlation between dispersion and an indicator variable for small positive earnings surprises of 1 or 2
cents (‘‘just beat’’) versus small negative earnings surprises of -1 or -2 cents (‘‘just miss’’)
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6 Conclusions
Prior studies link variation in the incidence of zero and small positive earnings
surprises to earnings management. We examine an alternative explanation based on
strategic analyst forecast pessimism. We argue that earnings forecast uncertainty
(i.e., lack of precision in analysts’ information signals about a firm’s earnings) is
negatively associated with analysts’ ability to slightly understate their forecasts and
help firms meet or just beat expectations. Consistent with this prediction, we show
that firms with relatively low forecast uncertainty are significantly more likely to
report earnings that just beat rather than just miss analyst expectations. Our results
are robust to the inclusion of an array of control variables, the use of an alternative
measure of forecast uncertainty, and tests of potential alternative explanations.
Our study contributes to the literature on the interpretation of the asymmetry
around zero in the frequency distribution of earnings surprises and provides
evidence on a relatively unexplored explanation for the asymmetry based on
analysts’ forecasts. We highlight the importance of our findings for studies that
employ small earnings surprises to measure constructs related to earnings
management, and show that controlling for dispersion can materially change
inferences in settings where a variable of interest is correlated with uncertainty.
Overall, our findings are consistent with the notion that strategic analyst forecast
pessimism plays a key role in explaining zero and small positive earnings surprises.
These findings matter for researchers that select firms suspected of earnings
management based on zero and small positive earnings surprises. Our study
suggests that their samples are more likely sorted based on variation in forecast
uncertainty than on earnings management.
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Appendix: variable definitions
SURPRISE Quarterly earnings surprise in cents per share, calculated as the difference
between actual earnings per share (EPS) and the mean consensus forecast
based on individual analysts’ latest EPS forecasts before the quarterly
earnings announcement (I/B/E/S fiscal period indicator ‘‘FPI’’ = 6), where
actual and forecasts of EPS are both obtained from the I/B/E/S unadjusted
detail files and at least three analysts are required to contribute to the
consensus; to account for stock splits between the analyst forecast and
earnings announcement dates, cumulative stock split factors are obtained
from CRSP and merged separately with the forecast and announcement dates;
if the cumulative split factor at the forecast date is different from the
cumulative split factor at the earnings announcement date, the forecast of
earnings per share is multiplied by the ratio of the cumulative price
adjustment factor at the announcement date to the cumulative price
adjustment factor at the forecast date
Just beat versus just
miss
Indicator variable set equal to 1 if SURPRISE equals 1¢ or 2¢ per share, 0 if
SURPRISE is -1¢ or -2¢ per share
Meet/just beat versus
all other




Indicator variable set equal to 1 if SURPRISE equals 0¢ or 1¢ per share, 0 if
SURPRISE is negative
DISP Standard deviation of individual analysts’ latest EPS forecasts before the
earnings announcement, in cents per share
MV Market value of equity at the end of the previous fiscal quarter (COMPUSTAT
Fundamentals Quarterly data items ‘‘PRCCQ’’ x ‘‘CSHOQ’’)
BTM Book-to-market ratio at the end of the previous fiscal quarter, calculated as the
book value of equity (COMPUSTAT Fundamentals Quarterly data item
‘‘SEQQ’’) divided by the market value of equity (MV)
GROWTH Variable capturing the proportion of the most recent eight firm-quarters in
which the firm reported positive seasonally-differenced earnings per share
(COMPUSTAT Fundamentals Quarterly data item ‘‘EPSPXQ’’ adjusted for
‘‘AJEXQ’’)
ERC Firm-specific sensitivity of stock price to earnings news, calculated as the ERC
(slope coefficient) obtained from rolling time-series regressions of
announcement-window abnormal returns (three-day cumulative size-adjusted
returns centered around the earnings announcement date from CRSP) on
earnings surprise scaled by the stock price 2 days prior to the earnings
announcement date (CRSP) using the past 20 firm-quarters (requiring a
minimum of eight firm-quarter observations)
MNA Indicator variable set equal to 1 if an M&A announcement is observed in the
90-day window prior to the quarterly earnings announcement, 0 otherwise
(source: Thomson One (formerly SDC Platinum))
SEO Variable capturing the proportion of the most recent eight firm-quarters in
which the firm engaged in seasoned equity offerings (source: Thomson One
(formerly SDC Platinum))
INSELL Variable capturing the proportion of the most recent eight firm-quarters in
which the firm’s insiders (officers and directors) were net sellers of the firm’s
stock (source: Thomson Reuters Insider Filing database)
INST Percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional investors based on 13-F
filings (Source: Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings database)
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LAGRET Prior abnormal stock returns, computed as 60-day cumulative size-adjusted
return prior to the earnings announcement (source: CRSP’s ‘‘erdport1’’ file)
LAGDQEPS Quarter t-1 seasonally-differenced earnings per share (COMPUSTAT
Fundamentals Quarterly data item ‘‘EPSPXQ’’ adjusted for ‘‘AJEXQ’’)
SHRS Number of shares outstanding at the end of the previous fiscal quarter
(COMPUSTAT Fundamentals Quarterly data item ‘‘CSHOQ’’)
PRICE Stock price at the end of the previous fiscal quarter (COMPUSTAT
Fundamentals Quarterly data item ‘‘PRCCQ’’)
SPLIT Indicator variable set equal to 1 if the company split its stock in the 365 days
prior to the earnings announcement (source: CRSP)
NUMEST Number of analysts contributing to the consensus forecast (source: I/B/E/S)
HORIZON Age of the consensus forecast, calculated as the mean of the number of days
between the earnings announcement date and the individual analyst earnings
forecast
AAER Indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firm-quarter’s net income is identified as
materially overstated in an AAER, based on the extended sample of Dechow
et al. (2011), 0 otherwise; variable is set to missing for fiscal quarters after
2007 due to limited data coverage
GUIDE Indicator variable set equal to 1 if public earnings guidance is observed for the
firm-quarter, 0 otherwise (source: I/B/E/S); variable is used only for fiscal
quarters ending in the period after Reg FD (2000:11 through 2013:12)
BLOAT Variable capturing balance sheet bloat, calculated as the ratio of previous
quarter net operating assets (NOA) to lagged sales (COMPUSTAT
Fundamentals Quarterly data item ‘‘SALEQ’’), where NOA equals
shareholders’ equity (COMPUSTAT Fundamentals Quarterly data item
‘‘SEQQ’’) less cash and cash equivalents (COMPUSTAT Fundamentals
Quarterly data item ‘‘CHEQ’’) plus total debt (sum of COMPUSTAT
Fundamentals Quarterly data items ‘‘DLCQ’’ and ‘‘DLTTQ’’)
Q4 Indicator variable set equal to 1 for the fourth quarter in the fiscal year, 0
otherwise
CFF Indicator variable set equal to 1 if at fiscal-quarter-end at least one analyst
forecast of quarterly or annual cash flow per share is available in the I/B/E/S
summary file, 0 otherwise
INACCR Quarterly decile rank of a firm-quarter measure of the average past (relative)
forecast inaccuracy of analysts that contribute to the current consensus
forecast, calculated as the firm-quarter mean of a variable that captures the
fraction of all forecast errors by an individual analyst over the preceding five-
year period (excluding the firm of interest) which are greater in absolute value
than the median firm-quarter individual forecast error
TARGETVAR Firm-quarter specific measure of earnings target variability, measured as the
time series coefficient of variation in daily changes in the consensus forecast,
where the consensus forecast is constructed for each day in the 360-day
period prior to the firm-quarter’s earnings announcement; we additionally use
individual forecasts with ‘‘FPI’’ equal to 7 (two quarters ahead), 8 (three
quarters ahead), 9 (four quarters ahead), and N (five quarters ahead) to
construct a daily consensus; at each point in time, we remove stale forecasts
by including only forecasts made in the most recent 180 days when
computing the daily consensus; if multiple forecasts are found by the same
analyst for the same firm-quarter, only the most recent forecast is retained
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